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This  paper examines the distinctive features of the Philippine National Bank, 
particularly through its lending practices in agriculture. First by examining the 
enactment  and  revision of the National Bank Act, the Bank's characteristics as an 
organization and operations are discussed. Second, the process by which the Bank 
began its operations and administration of agricultural loans is traced. Third, the 1918 
dispute over lending in agriculture is depicted as a striking example of the nature of its 
banking operations, before presenting the dual structure of agricultural loans provided 






    The Philippine National Bank was officially incorporated on May 2, 1916 under the 
National Bank Act of the Philippine Legislature, and its full-scale operations began on 
July 24, 1916. Its authorized capital was 20 million pesos, or 10 million dollars. Why 
was the Philippine National Bank established? It  is interesting to follow the 
consequences of an alignment in the demands of the emergent Filipino elite for a bank 
like Philippine National Bank, and the interests of the Bureau of Insular Affairs (BIA) in 
Washington as well as those of Manila-based American merchants.   
    First, the move to establish a larger agricultural bank was initiated by the Filipino 
elite in the early 1910s. During this period, the Agricultural Bank of the Philippine 
Government realized its inability to provide enough agricultural loans for landowners 
who had growing interests in the expansion of export agriculture. In October 1911, 
Governor-General W. Carmen Forbes gave a hearing to an idea of Benito Legarda, a 
Filipino member of the Philippine Commission, that a private mortgage bank backed by 
French capital (and bearing the name of Crédit Foncier de Philippines) be established. 
In early 1913, a Negros Occidental assemblyman by the name of Montilla submitted a 
bill to the Third Philippine Legislature seeking to increase the  capitalization  of the 
Agricultural Bank of the Philippine Government by appropriating one million pesos 
from the Philippine Treasury fund.
1
    Previously, the possibility of establishing an agricultural bank under private capital 
was repeatedly discussed in exchanges between the American officials in Washington 
and in Manila. But the most serious problem was that American capital showed no 
strong interest in the opportunity of investing in an agricultural bank in the Philippines. 
As a result, Frank McIntyre, Chief of the BIA wrote  Governor-General Forbes in 
Manila in May 1913 and proposed that a government bank, rather than private banks, 
should be the one to provide agricultural loans to local cash crop producers.
 
2
    By the early 1910s it was not only the Filipino elite but also Manila Americans 
 3 
 
who expressed the need for such a bank to service their business activities. Under these 
circumstances, in the middle of 1915, Vice Governor-General Henderson Martin drafted 
a bill seeking to establish an insular bank as the government credit bank not only for 
agriculture, but also for  industry and commerce. In October of the same year, 
Governor-General Francis Burton Harrison recommended the institution of a 
multi-purpose national bank to provide  support  for  the total development of the 
Philippine economy under the colonial state.
3
    Initially, Frank McIntyre disagreed with Harrison’s recommendation. He was of the 
opinion that the insular government should not further involve itself in the lending 
business. After receiving information that the International Banking Corporation had 
merged with the National City Bank of New York in 1915, McIntyre recommended to 
Harrison that the Philippine government should totally withdraw from the banking 
business and devolve its investing commitments to the National City Bank. Although 
opinions in the Philippine Chamber of Commerce in Manila were divided regarding the 
involvement of the Philippine government in the banking, members were in basic 
agreement on a standing proposal or advocacy for a four-fold increase of the capital 
investments in the proposed bank.
 
4
   In the Philippine Assembly, the leaders of the Nacionalista Party recognized the 
importance of establishing a government credit bank as proposed by Martin. For them, 
it was important that the bank should be not an American bank, but a bank of the insular 
government. Manuel L. Quezon even asked the revaluation of the Martin bill by H. 
Parker Willis, secretary of the Board of the Governors of the newly-formed U.S. Federal 
Reserve Board in Washington. Willis himself later drafted a new bill with the intent of 
establishing a government bank that would shoulder larger tasks relating to investment 
in private sectors, currency control and the administration of colonial government funds. 
In December 1915, the Willis bill was sent to Manila with the support of Quezon. It was 
repackaged as a new bill, after being combined with the Martin bill, and passed as Act 
No. 2612 (An Act Creating the Philippine National Bank) by the Philippine Legislature 







Enactment and Revision of the Philippine National Bank Act 
 
     Act No. 2612 led to the organization and operation of the Philippine National Bank. 
Now known as the Philippine National Bank Act of 1916, this act was revised twice by 
Act No. 2747 in 1918 and Act No. 2938 in 1921. One can limn the salient 
characteristics of the operation and organization of the National Bank by examining 
these acts and their amendments of the original bill.   
     Operation: Major sections of Act No. 2612 concerning the operation of the Bank 
include the following:
6
(1) The capitalization of the National Bank was pegged at 20 million pesos, divided 
into 200,000 shares of the value at par of one hundred pesos. The Philippine 
government would purchase 101,000 shares by the end of January 1917, while 
the remaining 99,000 shares were to be offered to the public (Sec. 3 and 4). 
   
(2) All the assets and liabilities of the Agricultural Bank of the Philippine 
Government would be transferred to the National Bank. Such a transfer of the 
Agricultural Bank’s assets would be deemed as partial payment of the shares of 
the National Bank subscribed by the Philippine Government (Sec. 6). 
(3) The National Bank was authorized to loan amounts not to exceed 50 percent of 
its capital and surplus and all amounts realized from the sale of real estate bonds 
on notes secured by real estate mortgages. Payment of such notes would be 
secured by first mortgages on farm lands in the Philippine Islands. Such loans 
were to be barred from exceeding 60 percent of the actual value of farm lands. 
The due date of the mortgages would not be less than one year and not more 
than thirty years. Loans of this kind were to be offered  for the purpose of 
promoting agriculture (Sec. 10). 
(4) The National Bank was authorized to loan amounts not exceeding 30 percent of 
its capital and surplus and the full amount of circulating notes on promissory 
notes, drafts and bills of exchange issued or drawn for agriculture, industrial or 
commercial purposes (Sec. 11). 5 
 
(5) The National Bank was authorized to issue loans in amounts not to exceed 20 
percent of its capital and surplus, 70 percent of its deposits subject to check and 
85 percent of its time deposits (Sec. 12). 
(6) The preference was given to the loans specified in Section 11 and 12 thusly. 
(a) To make loans on harvested and stored crops, with such loans not exceeding 
70 percent of the market value of the crops (Sec. 14). 
(b) To make loans to the producers on standing crops of rice, hemp, copra, sugar, 
tobacco, etc. For the grant of such loans, the National Bank might require 
additional security in the nature of mortgages on real estate or upon livestock, 
machinery and agricultural implements (Sec. 14). 
(7) The National Bank was authorized to issue its notes known as circulating notes 
in any amount not exceeding 75 percent of the securities held by the Bank. In 
addition, the National Bank would have the authority to issue its circulating 
notes against the gold coin of the United States (Sec. 18).   
(8) The National Bank was authorized to receive deposits of funds from the  insular,    
provincial and municipal governments, Postal Savings Bank, associations, 
corporations and private persons. It was obligatory for the insular, provincial and 
municipal governments to make their deposits with the Bank (Sec. 19). 
(9) The National Bank might establish up to two branches or agencies in the United 
States. The said branches or agencies were to receive, transmit and disburse any 
funds of the insular or U.S. governments or private corporations or individuals 
and to engage in business with the Federal Reserve Bank of the district in which 
the said branches or agencies might be located (Sec. 33). 
(10) The National Bank might establish branches in the provincial or municipal 
capitols. The agents or other officers of these branches would be appointed. With 
the authorization of the Governor-General, the Board of Directors might appoint 
as agents, cashiers or tellers of these branches the provincial or municipal 
treasures (Sec. 34). 
The Philippine National Bank was thereby established as a multi-purpose bank (or a 
large-scale credit institution), for issuing bank notes, controlling currency reserve and 6 
 
the dual function of serving as depository of  government funds and as  the foreign 
agency of the U.S. Federal Reserve Board.
7  The National Bank became a de facto 
governmental bank, and welcomed only a minimum investment of private capital.
8
    Some sections of Act No. 2612 were subsequently revised in February 1918 by Act 
No. 2747, to wit:
  As 
a lending bank, the National Bank now had great latitude in extending agricultural loans 
although mostly short-term loans on harvested or standing crops. It authorized capital 
turned out to be ten times bigger than that of the Agricultural Bank, its forerunner. 
9
(1) Section 11, 12 and 13 of Act No. 2612 were hereby deleted. 
   
(2) The revision of Section 14 determined the major business of the National Bank to 
consist in (a) the purchase or discounting of promissory notes, drafts and bills of 
exchange; (b) the extension of  loans  on, or the discount of,  notes secured by 
harvested and stored crops; (c) the making of agricultural loans on standing crops; 
(d)  the provision of loans for the provincial and municipal governments or 
branches of the insular government on promissory notes guaranteed by the insular 
government or the  purchase  of  bonds issued by the provincial and municipal 
governments or branches of the insular government; and,  (e)  the issuance of 
advances or discount paper for agricultural, manufacturing, industrial, or 
commercial purposes (Sec. 11). 
(3) The revision of  Section 18 stipulated that  the National Bank could only  issue 
circulating notes not exceeding the amount of the paid-up capital and surplus of the 
bank and the amount of gold coin of the United States (Sec.15). 
(4) The amendment to Section 37 now lifted off the limitation on the amount of any 
real estate mortgage loan of 50,000 pesos and any other loan of 300,000 pesos  
(Sec. 34). 
        Immediately notable about the revised National Bank Act of 1918 was its emphasis, 
together with agricultural loans, on loans for manufacturing, industrial and commercial 
purposes. In addition, not only were the restrictions on the amount of loans imposed by 
Sections 10-12 in the Act of 1916 lifted, except for the real estate mortgage loans, but 
also the limitation of the amount of loans were deleted. In doing so, the Act made it 7 
 
possible for the National Bank to provide larger-amount loans or discount paper for 
various business sectors in need of them. 
        On January 1921, Act No. 2938 was enacted with the following revisions to the 
original legislation:
10
(1) The National Bank was authorized to increase its capital from 20 million pesos to 
50 million pesos and to a new issue of 300,000 shares of stock to be denominated 
the second issue, at the par value of 100 pesos. By June 30, 1921, the Philippine 
government would purchase all the remaining shares of the first issue and par of 
the second issue of no less than 153,000 shares. The remaining shares could then 
be offered to the provincial and municipal governments or to the public (Sec. 3 
and 4). 
 
(2) Any loan or credit account transferred to the National Bank by the Agricultural 
Bank which was found to be uncollectible were to be subject to foreclosure by the 
National Bank (Sec. 7).   
(3) The National Bank was authorized to issue loans  for agricultural purposes in 
amounts  not to exceed 60 percent of its capital and surplus and all amounts 
realized from the sale of real estate bonds (Sec. 9). 
The most drastic revision of 1921 was the 2.5-time  increase  in the Bank’s  paid-up 
capital that it approved, and for this purpose, not only the Philippine government but 
also provincial and municipal governments were encouraged to purchase National Bank 
shares themselves. Also noteworthy were the significantly larger expansion of the total 
amount available for loans (given the increase in the Bank’s capitalization), including 
the jump up in the percentage of the amount of loans against paid-up capital and surplus. 
Five years after its establishment, the Philippine National Bank thus emerged as a giant 
multi-purpose governmental bank with a strong focus on loans or credit accessible to 
various business sectors. 
      Organization: The major regulations concerning the organization of the National 
Bank were stated in Act No. 2612 as follows: 
(1) The Bank was to be managed by a Board of Directors consisting of the President, 
Vice President, and other five members. The President of Bank was vested with 8 
 
the power to make loans on commercial papers for maximum periods of four 
months and in maximum sums of 50,000 pesos (Sec. 20). 
(2) The President and Vice President were to be appointed by the Governor-General 
but with the assent of the Upper House of the Philippine Legislature. The other 
five members of the Board of Directors were to occupy elective positions, in 
accordance with the provision for it by the Corporation Law (Act No. 1459) (Sec. 
21). 
(3) The Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands was designated as the attorney of 
the Bank (Sec. 25). 
(4) The Bank was to be subject to inspection by the Insular Treasurer (Sec. 27). 
(5) The President and Vice President of the Bank could expect appointments for a 
term of six years. The other five members of the Board of Directors were to hold 
office for one year (Sec. 30). 
(6) The stockholders had the responsibility to meet in March of each year to elect the 
five directors or members of the Board (Sec. 31). 
  The above regulations were not changed by the Act No. 2747 of 1918, but were revised 
by the Act No. 2938 of 1921 in the following specific ways:
11
(1) The number of the members of the Board of Directors was increased from seven 
to nine (Sec. 16). 
 
(2) The stockholders would meet in March of each year to elect the members of the 
Board of Directors. The directors of the Board would elect a President and a Vice 
President from among themselves, once the terms of incumbents end (Sec. 17). 
(3) The orders and resolutions of the Board of Directors were to be carried out by a 
general manager who would be chief executive of the Bank, with the help of an 
assistant general manager (Sec. 18). 
(4) The Board was granted the power to fix the rate of interest, discount or exchange 
to be charged by the Bank and to fix different rates of interest on loans, along the 
authorization to establish branches or agencies in the United States (Sec. 19). 
(5) The general manager of the Bank was vested with the power to make loans on 
commercial papers for maximum periods of four months and in maximum sums 9 
 
of 50,000 pesos (Sec. 20).       
The most conspicuous feature of the revised act of 1921 was that it designated the 
Board of Directors as the overseeing authority on the management of the National Bank, 
and it turned the general manager into the Bank’s officer in charge. Even more striking 
was that the power to make loans now devolved from the Board of Directors to the 
general manager. 
    Aside from such modifications, the revised Acts of 1918 and 1921 also brought 
about significant changes in terms of the Bank’s organizational structure. Section 31 of 
Act No. 2612 determined for each stockholder or his authorized proxy the right to vote 
in accordance with the number of registered shares of stock. (This regulation retained its 
original formulation in Section 28 of the revised Act of 1918.) However, in the revised 
Act of 1918, the following important provision was added to Section 4: “The voting 
power of all the stock of the National Bank owned and controlled by the Philippine 
government shall be vested exclusively in a committee consisting of the 
Governor-General, the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of the 
Representatives.”
12  Section  4 of the revised Act of 1921 also stipulated  that “The 
voting power of all the stock of the National Bank owned and controlled by the 
Government of the Philippine Islands shall be vested exclusively in a board, the short 
title of which shall be ‘Board of Control,’ composed of the Governor-General, the 
President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of the Representatives.”
13
    The Board of Control that first appeared in the revised Act of 1921 now seemed to 
function as the umbrella organization for the bank’s management, as might be affirmed 
in the following sections of Act No. 2938:
 
14
(1) The Bank was authorized to invest a sum not exceeding 10 percent of its paid-up 
capital in the purchase of share of stock of any bank in the United States. With 
the approval of the Board of Control, the Bank might incorporate any of its 
foreign agencies (Sec. 10). 
    
(2) In case of emergency, under the approval of the Board of Control, the Secretary 
of Finance might authorize the Bank to rediscount commercial paper of not over 
six months maturity, secured by exports or imports, ad might issue against said 10 
 
commercial paper circulating notes for sums not to exceed 75 percent of the 
value (Sec. 14). 
(3) The general manager would be appointed by the Board of Directors, with the 
advice and consent of the Board of Control (Sec. 18). 
(4) The general manager of the bank would have the duty to furnish any information 
regarding the operation of the Bank upon request of the Secretary of Finance, 
Governor-General or Board of Control (Sec. 20). 
(5) The Insular Auditor would be ex-officio auditor of the Bank and would, with the 
advice and consent of the Board of Control, appoint a representative who would 
be chief of the auditing department of the Bank. The representative of the Insular 
Auditor would make a quarterly report on the condition  of the Bank to the 
Governor-General, the Secretary of Finance, the Board of Control, the Insular 
Auditor and the Board of Directors (Sec. 22). 
(6) Whenever the President or Vice President, by the order of the Board of Directors, 
would some extra duties, they may be granted additional compensation, with the 
written approval of the member of the Board of Control (Sec. 23). 
(7) The Bank would at any time keep in its vaults or with the Insular Treasury a sum 
in lawful money either of the Philippines or of the United States. Whenever the 
lawful money kept in the Bank would be below the amount prescribed, the Bank 
shall restrict the business of making loans or discounts. However, the Secretary 
of Finance, at the request of the Board of Directors with the approval of the 
Board of Control, would be authorized to suspend the requirement of maintain 
the proportion of reserve specified in the Act (Sec. 44). 
(8) With the approval of the Board of Control, the Bank was authorized to guarantee 
the principal and interest of bonds issued by corporations for the erection of 
industrial plants (Sec. 45).   
To sum up, with the insertion of various regulations regarding the Board of Control in 
the revised Act of 1921, this Board got charged with  strong authority over  the 
management of the National Bank. The intervention of the colonial state and its political 
power in the management of the National Bank effectively received affirmation and 11 
 
legitimation.   
 
 
Commencement of Banking Operations and Agricultural Loans 
 
    The first president of the Philippine National Bank was H. Parker Willis, a famous 
American economist.
15  A specialist in  banking and finance, Willis  served as the 
secretary of the U.S. Federal Reserve Board from 1914 to 1918, taking a one year leave 
from this lofty position to work for the Philippine National Bank in 1916-1917. He 
actually served as bank president for only several months (from May to September 
1916), then returned to the United States. He resigned from the Bank’s presidency in 
February 1917. His role in the incorporation of the National Bank was, nonetheless, 
extremely important because, as has been discussed earlier, it was Willis himself who 
drafted the bill seeking the Bank’s establishment.  Upon his return  from his  Manila 
posting, Willis accepted an appointment as professor of banking at Columbia University 
in 1917, and stayed with this academic involvement till 1937. It was from this academic 
placement that he wielded enormous influence on American foreign policy.
16
After serving as the National Bank’s president, Willis published a short but very 
informative article on the beginnings  of the Philippine National Bank in 1917.
      
17 
According to Willis, the first step in commencing the bank’s operations  was  the 
installations of a definite accounting system that involved a careful examination of the 
assets of the Agricultural Bank of the Philippine Government. This resulted in the 
assumption of all its liabilities and the transfer of all of its assets, except the mortgages 
of approximately 900,000 pesos that were either in default or deemed bad.
18  Table I-1 
shows the balance sheet of the National Bank as of May 25, 1916, showing the paid-up 
capital of the bank at  approximately 2.4 million pesos, composed of  the assets 
transferred from the Agricultural Bank as well as the initial subscription of one million 
pesos by the insular government.
19  Loans and discounts amounted to nearly 5.5 million 
pesos, most of which seemed to be agricultural loans transferred from the Agricultural 
Bank. The deposits of over nine million pesos might be, largely, the government funds 12 
 
that were received by the National Bank under its regulations. 
    With these assets, the National Bank began operating, but the immediate problem it 
had to address was the recruitment of competent staff to run it. The former Agricultural 
Bank came with a staff of about fifteen persons, three or four of whom worked as the 
inspectors of agricultural lands that were used as collateral for loans. The National Bank 
found them incompetent and thus were not rehired, but other staffers of the Agricultural 
Bank  were retained to form  a nucleus for the Bank’s  Agricultural  Division. These 
staffers  had enough technical experience, but a few of  the newly employed staff 
required some retraining. Thus, during the months of May, June and the first half of July, 
the Bank conducted a  special training course for the benefit of  approximately fifty 
staffers. Another problem was the lack of necessary facilities and equipment of the Bank 
not easy to avail of, locally. It thus took almost two months for the Bank’s physical 
plant to get set up.
20
    Despite these various obstacles, the Bank’s business commenced operations and 
expanded smoothly. Even those in Manila’s business circles who had initially regarded 
it with suspicion soon welcomed the possibilities it represented and began to deposit 
some portion of their funds with the new Bank. Table I-2 compiles the Bank’s balance 
sheet as of December 31, 1916. A comparison of Table I-1 and Table I-2 reveals that the 
amount of the Bank's paid-up capital and that of its loans and discounts doubled, while 
total amount of deposits increased more than four-fold in a time span of only six months. 
Table  I-2  includes  the unmatured foreign bills or the exchange  for future delivery 
among the items of assets that were not included in Table I-1. Strikingly, the amount of 
the unmatured foreign bills accounted for 6 percent of the total assets, showing the 
larger weight of foreign trade related business in the Bank’s operations. We cannot 
break down the item of loans and discounts that make up 25 percent share of the assets; 
however, it is apparent that loans constitute a large portion of it. In terms of liabilities, 
deposits comprised 83 percent of the total, distributed as: Philippine government shares, 
63 percent; individual accounts; 10 percent; and fixed deposits, 25 percent. 
   
    One of the most important initial operations of the Philippine National Bank, 
among others, was to provide agricultural loans for export crop production. As a public 13 
 
institution,  with  the majority of its stock owned by the government, and a large 
percentage of its liabilities consisting of public deposits, the Philippine National Bank 
was  expected to entertain  all legitimate demands for agricultural loans in a fairly 
expeditious fashion. But  in the export expansion during World  War I, demands for 
agricultural loans proved to be far beyond the capacity of the Philippine National Bank 
and required highly selective consideration of loan applications. The interest rate for 
agricultural loans was set at eight percent per year for the mortgages secured by land 
having a Torrens title, and at 10 percent for mortgages with a Spanish title. The loan 
applications varied in amount from a few pesos to the hundreds of thousands.
21
    The most crucial problem, at this time, involved the absence of proper titles for 
much of the agricultural landholdings, and even where  the landholdings were 
presumably titled under the Spanish system,  there were many cases whereby the 
Spanish title certifications could not properly be procured and presented by landholders. 
Needless to say, the process in issuing Torrens titles was very slow. The Philippine 
government enacted the Land Registration Act in 1902 and the Public Land Act in 1903 
and then the Cadastral Act in 1913 to systematize and modernize the land titling system. 
However, as late as 1918, only 70,000 farms could be shown to hold Torrens titles out 
of nearly 2 million farms (4 percent of the total), while nearly 230,000 farms (12 
percent of the total) could be determined to have proper Spanish titles.
   
22  This limited 
land titling significantly cut down the total volume of agricultural loan applications to 
the National Bank, automatically invalidating many that would have otherwise deserved 
serious attention.
23
       Section 10 of Act No. 2612, as has been discussed, ruled that the total amount of 
loans that the National Bank could provide should not exceed one half of the Bank’s 
capital and surplus and all its proceeds from the sale of real estate bonds. At the onset of 
the Bank’s operations, such bonds had not been sold so that the actual sums available 
for agricultural loans were only one half of the capital and surplus.
        
24  Table  I-1 
demonstrates that the total amount of loans and discounts of the National Bank reached 
a level of 2.3 times of the paid-up capital as of May 1916 and most of these were the 
residual mortgages carried over from the old Agricultural Bank. This situation restricted 14 
 
the National Bank to a provision of loans in amounts lesser than those prescribed by law. 
To ensure that it functioned as a lending bank in accord with its mandate, more practical 
measures were taken on the inclusion of the mortgages from the Agricultural Bank (in 
limited amount of loan provided), and more new loans were made available by the bank 
authorities. Consequently, by the end of 1916, the total amount of loans and discounts 
reached 13 million pesos, almost three times the paid-up capital (Table I-2).   
What kind of measures were taken, then, by the National Bank to provide such 
agricultural loans as expected of it? According to Willis, in its capacity  as  a 
semi-governmental bank, the National Bank had to closely scrutinize the documentation 
presented by  applicants  so as  to “insure safety and conservatism.”
25  To obtain 
agricultural loans, one was required to submit two reports from independent sources 
with a reference on the assessment of the actual value of the land offered as collateral. 
One of such reports needed to be obtained from “a traveling agent in the employ of the 
Bank, who should visit the land and personally inspect it and decide upon its 
income-producing powers, the honesty of the proprietor, and other essential 
questions.”
26  At the time, it was not easy to deploy assessors who could make such 
value determinations, and thus, in most cases, the provincial tax assessors themselves 
had to shoulder the crucial task. The reports prepared by the provincial assessors were 
further checked by the provincial treasurer and when he deemed it necessary he 
included additional data for the evaluation of the proposed loan. (It was one month after 
its formal opening that the Bank began examining loan applications and deciding on 
them for approval or rejection.)
27
  We need to pay special attention to one unique feature in the agricultural loan 
operation of the Philippine National Bank. As stated by Willis, before the establishment 
of the Philippine National Bank, the Philippine government had deposited its revenues 
in the sum of 2.5 million pesos for crop loans, that is, loans on the standing sugar crop 
mainly in Negros and Panay Islands. After the organization of the Philippine National 
Bank, it was discussed whether the National Bank should take over the task of 
providing crop loans or allow private banks to administer them. With the special act of 
the Philippine legislature, government funds were transferred to the Philippine National 
 15 
 
Bank and the Bank took over the task of providing crop loans at large amounts.
28
      In July 1916, Willis, together with two directors of the Bank, visited Iloilo city in 
Panay Island and found various anomalies attendant to such crop loans. In many cases 
the planters who filed applications for crop loans already carried first mortgages, mostly 
under the former Agricultural  Bank.  Some of  the planters had outstanding second 
mortgages in favor of some local money-lenders or some other banks, and in extreme 
cases even held third mortgages. In many instances planters took special mortgages on 
their personal property, such as automobiles or machinery, so that it was often the 
situation  that the only remaining security they could offer was the actual standing 
crop.
  Since 
crop loans were offered not based on real estate as collaterals but based, instead, on 
standing crop, such a form of lending – usually not done under any modern banking 
system – ought to be understood as of the pre-modern type.   
29
      Given this scenario, a new set of guidelines was adopted to impose restrictions on 
crop loans administered by the National Bank and which called for: (1) the rejection of 
any loan application where the titling to the land was unclear; (2) the refusal of loans 
even if the title was clear, unless reasonable value could be found in the land; (3) the 
payment of loans by monthly installment to meet the actual needs of the planter for 
necessary expenses; (4) the signing of documents waiving all rights to the crops by 
mortgagers who held a prior lien on the land, as a precondition for the release of loans; 
(5) the requirement of one reliable guarantor for each loan (where the members of a 
family were joint owners of the land, all of them were to be deemed responsible for the 
whole loan on the land); (6)  the treatment of additional mortgages upon any other 
property, that any borrower could get, as collateral; and (7) the payment of the loan as 
soon as the sugar is produced and sold in the market.
   
30
   There were many instances of applications being rejected due to insufficiency of 
documentation, even as there were also not a few cases of loans being granted despite 
the inability of sugar planters (or landowners) to comply with the conditions as required. 
In 1916, applications  for loans totaled  2.2  million pesos and three-fourths of them 
received approval from the committee. But some loans were not released after approval 
 16 
 
for failures of certain planters to meet certain requirements such that, in the end, less 
than two thirds of the total applications for loans were actually made good. These strict 
measures by the National Bank discouraged many landowners in the sugar producing 
region, even provoking serious complaints from some of them, ostensibly expecting that 
the Bank might provide crop loans without any securities. During the mid-1910s local 
producers did not earn substantial profits (as expected) from sugarcane agriculture and 
the production of muscovado sugar (brown sugar with low polarization) at the small 
sugar mill installed in sugar plantations (or haciendas). The average cost of sugar 
production was four or five pesos per picul (63.25kg), while the selling price of the 
same was about 5 pesos at the Iloilo port for the past decade. Under these circumstances, 
many planters had to rely on crop loans and incurred indebtedness, a predicament made 
worse by the absence of any  prospects  for  modernizing  their sugar manufacturing 
operations.  It was thus that  Willis  argued for  the necessity of investing in the 
construction of modern sugar mills or centrals that could produce centrifugal sugar of 
higher quality, as its market price was far better than the old muscovado sugar, so as to 
be able to help the planters turn in higher profits on their capital outlays. He saw that the 
continuation of providing loans to the planters under the current uneconomical practice 
of sugar production could itself prove hazardous to the continued viability of the new 
Bank.
31
    
 
 
The 1918 Dispute over Lending in Agriculture 
 
Did the strictness on the Bank’s crop loan operations remain in place after the 
resignation of Willis from the  presidency? Samuel  Ferguson, who used to serve as 
vice-president, replaced Willis as the Bank’s second president, but also soon resigned in 
March 1918. Third president of the Bank was Venancio Concepcion, the first Filipino to 
serve in this capacity. As Peter Stanley points out, Concepcion’s  management  style 
proved to be the  exact of opposite  of the first president’s. Whereas  Willis tried to 
manage the Bank in accord with the structures of modern banking, Concepcion relied, 17 
 
instead, on personal connections to secure and support  the economic interests of 
privileged clients. Indeed, Concepcion worked to promote the policy of expansion in the 
provision of agricultural loans to the export sector, particularly in sugar production.
32
This American director, Archibald Harrison, brother of Governor-General Francis 
Burton Harrison, served as secretary of the Board of Directors of the National Bank.
 
By mid-1918, criticism from the American director of the Bank caused a fractious 
internal dispute that eventually led to this American director’s resignation. 
33 
Observing a lot of anomalies or violations of the regulations in place in relation to the 
Bank’s agricultural loans, he felt compelled, by May 1918, to suggest to the Bank’s 
Executive Committee to conduct an investigation of these irregularities and organize a 
committee for it. A committee was subsequently convoked for this purpose, with four 
appointive members: Archibald Harrison himself, Vicente Madrigal from the Executive 
Committee, Vicente Singson Encarnacion, and Fred N. Berry from the  Bank’s 
Agricultural Committee. Tasked to investigate the agricultural loans that the Bank’s 
Agricultural  Department  was administering, this committee, due to several reasons, 
ended up leaving it to Archibald Harrison, as its chairman, to conduct the    
investigation directly.
34  The compilation of various unpublished reports relating to the 
investigation is housed at the U.S. National Archives as well as in the Harrison Papers 
in the Library of the Congress in Washington D.C.
35
Some examples would suffice. One report, prepared by Archibald Harrison himself, 
and based on his field trip both in Iloilo of Panay Island and Bacolod of Negros Island 
in July 1918, reveals that the Bank’s Iloilo branch offered unreasonably huge crop loans 
to landowners in the provinces of Capiz or Iloilo, and in two provinces of Negros.
  These documents are very useful 
in determining the actual conditions of the National Bank's lending in agriculture for 
various areas like Pampanga or Bulacan Provinces in Central Luzon, or Iloilo Province 
on Panay Island, or the province of Negros Occidental. 
36  
Agricultural loans, in even larger amounts, and based on real estate as collateral, as well 
as crop loans, that is, loans based on the standing sugar crop, were made available to 
Negrense sugarcane planters. With the persistent low prices of muscovado sugar on the 
market, along with the epidemic spread of disease among farm animals, or unfavorable 18 
 
weather conditions, three years back, many sugar planters ended up being deeply and 
massively indebted to the National Bank.
37
One 1917 memorandum  by  the Manager of the Bank's Iloilo branch, which 
Harrison cites, shows that, in 1916/17,  this branch had 12 outstanding crop loans 
amounting to 59,728 pesos, while in 1917/18, its outstanding crop loans numbered at 72 
in the aggregate amount of 909,840 pesos. In 1918/19, the Bank’s Board of Directors 
approved 154 loans totalling 2,103,375 pesos. Of these, only 85 loans were actually 
released in the total amount of 241,164 pesos, apparently on account of a firm policy 
adopted by the Bank not to grant any new loans or, rather, not to process new loan 
applications from the same parties, until their previous accounts had been settled. After 
a sub-agency was opened in Bacolod, one of two inspectors of the Iloilo branch moved 
there and the remaining one inspector had occasion to visit the farms where loans were 
provided at least twice.
 
38
  Data are unavailable regarding the long-term agricultural loans processed by the 
Iloilo branch. Before the Bacolod sub-agency was opened, most long-term loans of this 
branch were offered to large-scale planters in Negros Occidental. As many of them had 
outstanding liabilities, the manager of the Iloilo branch asked  the Agricultural 
Department in the Manila office to  furnish the branch full information from their 
records on such liabilities.
 
39
After visiting haciendas in various towns of Negros Occidental, Harrison completed 
and compiled at least eight case reports: 
  Indeed,  there were quite a few cases in which Negros 
Occidental sugar planters received approval not only for long-term agricultural and crop 
loans but also for commercial loans.     
    Hijos de I. de la Rama: This firm, managed by Esteban de la Rama, incurred a 
total  obligation  of 1,294,000 pesos to the Bank, which included  794,000 pesos of 
outstanding crop loans for a three-year period, and 500,000 pesos in commercial loans. 
The collaterals for these loans were seven haciendas with a total hectarage of 2,700 and 
its sugar centrals located in the municipality of Bago; 85,000 piculs of centrifugal sugar 
and 7,613 piculs of muscovado sugar. This firm owned three more haciendas with a total 
hectarage of 1,000 and another small central in the municipality of Talisay, but these 19 
 
three haciendas appeared to have already been mortgaged to the Bank of the Philippine 
Islands. Two  small sugar centrals owned by Esteban de la Rama were deemed to be 
mismanaged, with de la Rama himself apparently lacking in managerial savvy; and 
given his bad relations with the sugar planters in the area, the centrals could not be 
operated in full capacity.
40
    Araneta family: This family controlled  12,000 hectares of land, stretching in 
sprawal from the coastal area to the mountain in Bago. This property was divided in 
ownership among family members. The Bank held crop and long-term loans, in the 
aggregate amount of 800,000 pesos, on it. It was found to be this family’s practice for 
one member to mortgage his property share so as to liquidate the amortization payments 
of another member’s. With what was discovered  to be a mismanagement of the 
plantations, the family faced difficulties in paying back the principal and interests of 
loans incurred with the Bank.
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    Gomez brothers: Located near the municipality of La Castellana, the hacienda of 
600 hectares and sugar central ran by the Gomez brothers were both and each valued at 
240,000 pesos.  This  family’s  indebtedness  totalled  491,000 pesos, exceeding the 
assessed value of the collaterals upon which its following loans were based: (1) a 
long-term loan (288,000 pesos) and a crop loan for 1917/18 (36,000 pesos) against the 
National Bank and (2) a debt against Germann & Co. (167,000 pesos). To top it all, 
another crop loan for 1918/19 (67,000 pesos) was also approved for this family.
 
42
    E. Guanco and Victoriano Siguenza: V. Siguenza is the father-in-law of E. 
Guanco and both had outstanding loans fromthe National Bank and the Bank of the 
Philippine Islands. Siguenza’s crop loan for 1917/18 from Germann & Co. was already 
overdue,  with the muscovado  sugar  he offered as security being determined to be 
insufficient to cover the obligation. He also got a loan of 35,000 pesos from the old 
Agricultural Bank, based on one of four haciendas he owned as collateral. This loan was 
supposedly intended for the purchase of animals and machinery but the money was 
instead used to help Guanco in his first payment for the construction of his sugar central.  
Guanco himself took a loan from Germann & Co. with four haciendas of 679 hectares 
as its collateral. Of these four haciendas, the larger two ones belonged to Siguenza, with 
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the remaining two listed under Guanco’s name. The Bank also approved a 1917/18 crop 
loan of 100,000 pesos against some 4,000 piculs of centrifugal sugar in Guanco’s favor. 
Additionally, Guanco had applied for a 1918/19 crop loan of about 160,000 pesos. On 
his ocular visit, Bank president Venancion Concepcion assessed the value of these four 
haciendas and a sugar mill at 1,350,000 pesos; but based on current market prices then, 
the properties were, in point of fact, only worth 685,000 pesos.
43
    Isabela Sugar Factory: A group of sugar planters headed by Gil Montilla built this 
sugar central in the municipality of Isabela. Together, these planters successfully applied 
for a considerable loan of 1.5 million pesos from the Bank with 6,000 hectares of their 
haciendas as security. This loan was approved by the Bank’s Executive Committee but 
the initial procedure was deemed irregular because the committee had previously agreed 
to a sparate loan for the purchase of machinery. Archibald Harrison voted in favor of the 
loan proper of 1.5 million pesos but on the precondition that the cost of machinery be 
included in it. About one third of the 6,000 hectarage is devoted to rice and its value was 
assessed  at 1.2 million pesos (200 pesos per hectare), a fairly higher estimate than 
would otherwise be the case, yet lower than the loan approved. The Bank’s investment 
in this sugar central through this loan was only the beginning and further financing from 
it would be required before the factory actually operated.
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    Properties owned by the heirs of Remigio Montilla: Members of this family 
included the widow, seven daughters, and one son, Emilio Montilla. Their seven farms 
totalled 731 hectares in area, located a few miles away from the proposed site of the 
Isabela Sugar Factory. These farms were apart from the 6,000 hectares that were 
pledged as security for the Isabela factory loan, and could not be included in that 
hectarage as this family was already heavily indebted, with an outstanding long-term 
loan of 115,000 pesos from the old Agricultural Bank as well as an unpaid crop loan of 
27,000 pesos. On Harrison’s visit to Emilio Montilla, this family’s financial position 
was determined to be quite tenuous, ostensibly made so by one practice of the Bank's 
Agricultural Department of issuing  either a new long-term loan or a crop loan to 
nearly-defauting debtors to help them cover the overdue interest.
 
45
    Yulo Brothers: This family owned six haciendas totaling 1,859 hectares in area, in 
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the municipality of Binalbagan, five of which were  mortgaged to the Bank as the 
collateral for a loan of 485,000 pesos. This loan was made available to the Yulo family 
to save their property from foreclosure by Ynchausti & Co. But the chance seemed 
rather slim for the Yulos be able to deliver on their obligation to the Bank owing to their 
wasteful and un-businesslike methods of farm management. Under the manager’s name, 
the family qualified for a 1917/18 crop loan of 45,000 pesos, 34,000 pesos of which 
remained unpaid. This was not secured by any sugar, but by mortgages on real estate in 
Iloilo province that could not be utilized as collateral on a crop loan. President 
Conception granted the crop loan, with the understanding that its proceeds were to be 
used to pay interest charges due Ynchausti & Co. the year before. President Conception 
estimated for the Bank’s Board of Directors the value of the Yulo agricultural assets at 
1,336,250 pesos. Harrison believed the properties to be overvalued, with his own 
assessment of its worth at a much lower sum of 630,000 pesos.
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    Salvador Serra: Serra’s hacienda, along with its sugar central, was located near 
the municipality of Ilog. The Bank had provided him a long-term loan of 160,000 pesos 
and a 1918/19 crop loan of 150,000 pesos. The proceeds of the long-term loan were 
used to cancel the obligations incurred in the purchase of machinery for the central, and 
the crop loan was intended for machinery and labor. Serra represented a sound example 
of successful plantation management, and his properties included: 280  hectares of 
sugarcane land (valued at 140,000 pesos); 220 hectares of wood land convertible into 
agricultural land (worth 22,000 pesos); and  machinery at the central and storage 
facilities (200,000 pesos in total value).
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  Most of the above eight cases were of sugar planters who built relatively smaller 
centrifugal mills or centrals in their respective haciendas and they might not represent 
general examples of sugar planters in Negros Occidental. Harrison later visited other 
muncipalities like Himamaylan, Pontevedra, and La Carlota to investigate the state and 
status of long-term loans or crop loans made by the Bank to borrowers in these areas. 
He discovered that, generally speaking, the long-term loans were provided there on a 
fairly sound basis, while crop loans were practically, without exception, excessively 
given. The trouble was that planters in these areas usually applied for their loans based 
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on overestimations of sugar production for the coming year, even as most of the loans 
approved by the Bank were slightly reduced in amounts against the declared figures of 
production.
48
George Seaver, Harrison’s research assistant, wrote of this glut of problematic crop 
loans offered to sugar planters in Negros Occidental in a letter addressed to Harrison 
and dated August 9, 1918. From mid-July to early August 1918, Seaver surveyed the 
areas from the municipality of Escalante in the north to Cauayan in the south, but 
excluded the fertile areas like Bacolod, Talisay, Silay, Victorias and Manapla. He 
conducted the investigation in 16 municipalities involving  230 cases of agricultural 
loans in the aggregate amount of 3,461,370 pesos covering a total of 49,695 hectares of 
land used as collaterals for them. He also examined 127 cases of unpaid crop loans 
since 1916, in the total sum of 2,209,311 pesos and found that, in many cases, loans 
were offered in sums exceeding  the market value of the lands used by debtors as 
collaterals. Loans were even provided to help nearly-defaulting borrowers make due 
payments, in installments, of the principal or the interest of previous loans. Seaver cited 
some striking examples to show the great risks faced by the Bank in loaning money on 
lands backed by Spanish titles. In one case, the Bank’s mortgage was for 248 hectares 
bearing a Spanish title but the cadastral survey yielded an actual landholding of less 
than 137 hectares only. In some instances,  the money obtained from the Bank for 
agricultural purposes was, in fact, diverted into commercial or industrial investments, 
and, occasionally, loaned out by other borrowers to other farmers at the rate of 25 
percent a year. In an extreme example, some influential men like the Justice of the 
Peace induced landowners to apply for loans from the Bank, acting as their agents in the 
preparation of documents, and upon approval of such applications, 50 percent of the 
amount would be deducted as their commission.
   
49
  In another letter, this time to this time to Archibald Harrison (and dated at August 
12, 1918),  Seaver reported that of the 230 agricultural loans inspected in Negros 
Occidental, 40 were found not complying with the required conditions, and 
recommended that some corrective measures should be taken in such cases. Among 
these cases, Seaver identified 35 cases of particular note: 22 cases of loans in amounts 
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of less than 10,000 pesos, 7 cases of loans ranging in amount from 10,000 to 19,999 
pesos, and 5 loans in amounts between 20,000 and 29,999 pesos, and one loan of 30,000 
pesos. Irregularities found included the following variations or patterns: (1) loans were 
not used for the original purpose such as clearing lands, the purchase of carabaos (water 
buffalos) or the payment in installments for the equipment of small sugar centrals; (2) 
New loans that were approved for the payment of outstanding loans were not used for 
this original purpose; and (3) Only a small part of land was actually cultivated or used 
for sugarcane agriculture, against the requirement that loans were offered to many of 
these haciendas (under Seaver’s investigation) for being nearly cultivated areas or being 
located near mountainous areas.
50
  Ricardo Nolan: He received three loans from the old Agricultural Bank: (a) 9,600 
pesos on the land lying southwest of Escalante, hectarage unknown; (b) 1,600 pesos on 
184 hectares of land situated northwest of Sagay; (c) 12,000 pesos on approximately 
194 hectares of located northwest of La Carlota. All of these lands were found to be 
unimproved and uncultivated.  Additionally,  Nolan had another landholding  of 216 
hectares, and a mortgage of 4,000 pesos was granted on this land by the Agricultural 
Bank in the name of Francisco Ferrer, but this also remained uncultivated.
  Let us take two examples here. 
51
  Jose E. Domingo: He obtained a loan of 13,000 pesos from the National Bank on a 
500-hectare property  northwest of Murcia. About 18 or 20 hectares was planted to 
sugarcane (but found to be poorly cultivated)  and 40 hectares to  upland rice. But 
practically all of this hacienda was of such an elevation that it could not, under normal 
circumstances, be considered as good agricultural land.
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    In a memorandum dated August 17, 1918 which examines certain applications for   
crop loans, Archibald Harrison shared his observation that notable sugar planters like 
Javellana and Ledesma, or the larger Spanish tobacco company Tabacalera obtained 
1917 crop loans and these sums presumably remained unpaid, and were they to secure 
1918 crop loans from the National Bank, these could conceivably be used to settle such 
previous and outstanding loans. He opined that this situation was absolutely improper 





    With his management style put into question by these investigative findings,  
President Venancio Concepcion sent a confidential report dated August 18, 1918 to 
Manuel L. Quezon, President of Senate, strongly contesting Harrison’s report and 
claiming that it was marred by falsehoods and  many mistakes.
54  In self-defense, 
Harrison called the Bank’s investigation committee into session, and sent other 
documents to Concepcion supporting his findings. A resolution was also adopted by the 
committee requesting formal comments or rejoinders from Concepcion.
55  In reply to 
Harrison’s committee, Concepcion informed its members about the dismissal of George 
Seaver and one other staffer  on September 1, 1918.
56  To make matters  worse for 
Harrison, Concepcion’s decision was supported by the other three Filipino members of 
the Agricultural Committee, Vicente Singson Encarnacion, Vicente Madrigal, and R. J. 
Fernandez.
57  In turn and given this escalating conflict with Concepcion, Harrison sent a 
letter to Concepcion filing his resignation from the post as secretary  of the Bank’s 
Board of Directors effective September 13, 1918.
58  Despite Harrison’s efforts, then, the 
National Bank failed in its aspiration to regulate agricultural loans and to subject them 
to strict terms. In 1921 the National Bank imposed a  regulation  permitting  the 
foreclosure of securities on irrecoverable loans but it was limited, in its applicability, 
only to the loans transferred from the old Agricultural Bank.
59
 
   
 
Decoding the Meanings of the Dual Structure of Lending in Agriculture 
 
   Ostensibly, the confrontation between Venancio Concepcion and Archibald Harrison 
over banking policy on agricultural loans, particularly in relation to crop loans, merely 
indicates a fact of antagonism between a Filipino president and an American director of 
the bank, or between a policy of favoritism inclined toward the interests of the planters 
involved in cash crop production and the strict policy of imposing modern banking 
regulations on the lending business in export agriculture. But beyond the argument on 
politics in banking or the dichotomies in banking operations between the modern and 
pre-modern system, we should consider the very reasons  why a pre-modern  credit 25 
 
system involving an unusual species of lending called crop loans  persisted in the 
National Bank throughout the 1920s. 
    Some  data on agricultural loans of the National Bank in the 1920s are worth 
examining in detail. Table I-3 shows that as of the end of 1925, the total amount of 
loans and discounts of the Bank reached 92.4 million pesos, 15 percent of which was in 
the form of agricultural loans (with real estate as collateral) and 7 percent of which 
consisted in  crop loans. Table I-4 indicates the amount of agricultural loans made 
available by the Bank by crop and by branch or agency as of the end of 1928.
60  It is 
noteworthy that nearly 70 percent of mid- and long-term agricultural loans and crop 
loans were provided for sugarcane agriculture, particularly by the branches of Bacolod 
and Iloilo. Comparing these two tables, one also sees that the amount of crop loans 
declined from 6.25 million pesos to 4.36 million pesos in three years from 1925 to 1928. 
It is no idle speculation to read this decline as one consequence of the Bank’s preference 
for agricultural loans over crop loans in the progress of land registration.
61
    This  declining trend in the Bank’s crop loan business is also borne out in the 
statistics compiled by the Bacolod and Iloilo branches.  The amount of crop loans 
provided by the Bacolod agency declined as follows: 3.88 million pesos (as of 
September 5, 1927), 3.07 million pesos (as of October 16, 1929), 1.69 million pesos (as 
of September 5, 1930) and 0.84 million pesos (April 30, 1931); for the Iloilo branch: 
approximately 250,000 pesos (October 10, 1929), 50,000 pesos (April 27, 1931) and 
110,000 pesos (October 16, 1933).
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    Why did the National Bank sustain this dual structure of its lending business in 
agriculture for fifteen years from the time of its establishment? The place of crop loans 
in the practices and policies of the Philippine National Bank during the American period 
is important for understanding the characteristics of the contradictory modern banking 
system in the  colonial Philippines, especially when regarded from the  much wider 
  Crop loans as the predominant form of credit thus 
practically cease by the end of 1920s, indicating the National Bank’s certain departure 
from the dual structure of its lending business in export agriculture, that is, the offering 
of mid-  and long-term agricultural loans based on real estate as collateral, and the 
facility of short-term loans premised on standing crops as securities. 26 
 
perspective of economic history. At the end of the nineteenth century when private 
landownership was not yet legally established under Spanish rule, commercial agency 
houses provided cash advances to growers using future crops as collateral instead of the 
usual  real estate.
63  This system was particularly and widely  adopted in the frontier 
regions of the emerging export economy like Negros Island. Sugar haciendas in Negros 
tended to be of large hectarage,  owned and managed by landowners who needed 
agricultural funds. We might also see the prototype of this crop loan system in the 
overseas Chinese money-lender’s business of offering cash advances  to farmers in 
return for their anticipated or future crops, a practice that might have germinated as 
early as the end of the eighteenth century.
64
     Indeed, the National Bank’s adoption of the crop loan system comes off as a kind 
of deviation from the norms of modern banking. But the evolving and unique 
characteristics of the Philippine export economy could only lead, inevitably, to the 
institution of this crop loan system at the very core of the modern banking system 
simultaneously being put in place under the Americans. For  the expansion of 
agricultural exports under the so-called “free trade” arrangements between the United 
States and the Philippines since the early 1910s, the banks had to develop a lending 
facility like it for cash-strapped planters interested and invested in the production for 
export to the American market. But certain problems then began to arise; for example, 
the inadequacy of legal land titles forced the National Bank to continue its crop loan 
business for an extended period. In these conditions lay the contradiction of a 
supposedly modern banking system, represented by the National Bank, to function, in 
point of fact, as a pre-modern (even hybrid) banking institution, forced to adapt its 
  In Southeast Asia, modern banking as well 
as money lending on a small scale grew in increasing importance with various efforts to 
sustain  cash crop production from  the late nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth 
century. That in the early twentieth century the crop loan business was enlarged, first by 
the private banks and, then, by the Agricultural Bank, as capitalized by Philippine 
government funds, and later succeeded in this capacity by a National Bank established 
or that related ends, are characteristics unique to the Philippines, especially when seen 
in comparison to its regional neighbors.   27 
 
structures and operations according to such contextual contingencies. The forays of the 
National Bank into the  crop loan business led to  the decline in  influence of larger 
British banks that had otherwise dominated this financial market up to the actual onset 
of American rule. In the 1920s, the National Bank emerged and grew as the largest and 
leading bank in the Philippines in the process of literally laying, in a systematic fashion, 
the foundations for local financial markets under the American dispensation and with 
the sanction of its colonial state. In this context, the conclusion is inescapable that the 
dual structure of agricultural loans in the Philippine National Bank itself embodied and 
reflected the very  characteristics of the export economy of the Philippines in its 
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 Table I-1 Balance Sheet of the Philippine National Bank (May 25, 1916)
    (in 1,000 pesos, %)
Resources Liabilities
Loans and discounts   5,460.6  (46.1) Capital (paid-up)   2,385.7  (20.2)
Interest accrued receivable      238.5  ( 2.0) Undivided profits       54.0  (  0.5)
Cash: With Insular Treasurer 
         and in banks   5,571.5  (47.1) Deposits   9,184.2  (77.6)
Due from agencies      562.8 (  4.8) Interest accrued receivable      106.9 (  0.9)
Other assets         4.3  (  0.0)      107.0 (  0.9)
Total 11,837.7 (100.0) Total(1)  11,837.7(100.0
  Source: H. Parker Willis, "The Philippine National Bank," The Journal of Political Economy,
              vol. 25, no. 5 (May 1917), p. 419.
    Note: (1) Due to rounding off, this differs to the aggregation of the amount of each item.
                                                                　           　Table I-2  Balance Sheet of the Philippine National Bank (December 31, 1916)
    (in 1,000 pesos, %)
Assets Liablities
Loans and discounts   13,012.6  ( 25.6) Capital (paid in)    4,364.4 (  8.6)
Unmatured foreign bill     2,965.3  (  5.8) Profit and loss      359.3 (  0.7)
Provincial overdrafts         30.4  (  0.1) Unearned discount        62.5 (  0.1)
U.S. government bonds       500.0  (  1.0) Reserved for taxes and fidelity bonds        11.0 (  0.0)
Philippine government bonds       286.0  (  0.6) Circulation      520.0 (  1.0)
Furniture and fixtures         70.7  (  0.1) Deposits (2)  42,341.1 (83.4)
Interest accured receivable       421.3  (  0.8) Acceptance         4.3 (  0.0)
Exchange for future delivery       800.1  (  1.6) Interest accrued payable      146.9 (  0.3)
Cash (due from branches, other banks, Exchange contracts      800.1 (  1.6)
  with Insular Treasurer)    30,142.1 ( 59.4) Letter of credit   2,176.8 (  4.3)
Customers liability L/C     2,558.0 (   5.0)
Total (1)    50,786.5 (100.0) Total  50,786.5(100.0)
   Source: H. Parker Willis, "The Philippine National Bank," The Journal of Political Economy,
               vol. 25, no. 5 (May 1917), p. 423.
    Note:    (1) Due to rounding off, this differs to the aggregation of the amount of each item.
(2) Insular government (2.67 million pesos), individual accounts (4.5 million pesos),
     Fixed deposits (107.7 million pesos) and others (0.82 million pesos).
 
　　　　　　　 
        Table I-3 Outstanidng Loans & Discounts of  Philippine    
         National Bank by Sector (December 31, 1925)
              (in 1,000 pesos, %)
Agricultural    13,486  (14.6)
Sugar centrals    48,549  (52.6)
Crop loans
     Sugar      6,041  (  6.5)
     Others         208  (  0.2)
Commercial    13,750   (14.9)
Coconut oil & others    10,340   (11.2)
Total    92,374 (100.0)
 Source: Draft of Annual Report of the Philippine 
            National Bank for the Year 1925 with a
            letter from Rafael Corpus to Manuel
            Quezon (Feb. 24, 19126), Philippine  
            National Library, Manuel L. Quezon Papers,
            Series IV, Subject File, Box 448.
  
 　  Table I-4 Outstanding Agricultural Loans of the Philippine National Bank   
                   by Crop and Branch (December 31, 1928) （in 1,000 pesos)
Agricultural Loan    Sugar     Rice   Coconut Manila hemp  Others   Total
Bacolod (1) 4,324 0 0 0 0 4,324
Cabanatuan 0 1,042 0 0 0 1,042
Cebu 112 0 74 0 186 372
Dagupan 0 512 0 0 0 512
Davao 0 0 188 438 0 626
Iloilo 4,426 0 0 0 0 4,426
Legaspi 0 90 180 180 0 450
Lucena 0 0 1,172 0 0 1,172
Total 8,862 1,644 1,614 618 186 12,924
Crop Loan    Sugar     Rice   Coconut Manila hemp  Others   Total
Bacolod (1) 4,144 0 0 0 0 4,144
Cabanatuan 0 56 0 0 0 56
Iloilo 217 0 0 0 0 217
Total 4,361 56 0 0 0 4,417
Source: "Philippine National Bank, Manila, Examiners' Report of Condition at Close of
            Business, Sept. 30, 1929," BIA 6769-187 & With.
   Note: (1) sub-agency till the mid-1920s.
　 　 　
 